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ABSTRACT
The predominant grid authentication mechanisms use public key infrastructure (PKI). Nonetheless,
certificate-less public key cryptography (CL-PKC) has several advantages that seem to well align with the
demands of grid computing. Security and efficiency are the main objectives of grid authentication
protocols. Unfortunately, certificate-less authenticated key agreement protocols rely on the bilinear
pairing, that is extremely computational expensive. In this paper, we analyze the recently secure certificate-
less key agreement protocols without pairing. We then propose a novel grid pairing-free certificate-less
two-party authenticated key agreement (GPC-AKA) protocol, providing a more lightweight key
management approach for grid users. We also show, a GPC-AKA security protocol proof using formal
automated security analysis Sycther tool.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Authentication in grid computing is considered as the first defense point of security aspects. Grid
authentication (GA) mechanism has to be efficient and secure. Moreover, GA mechanism should
fulfil the requirements of large scale distributed and heterogeneous grid virtual organizations
(VO), that usually spans multiple trust domains. Due to the dynamic nature of grid VOs and
frequent user requests, the identity of grid principals is verified by these authentication protocols
using cryptographically secure mechanisms, that have the following challenges: i) mutual
authentication for multi-domain, scalability and delegation, ii) single sign-on, identity federation
and credentials confidentiality, and iii) efficiency, lightweight and flexibility [1].
The most prevalent grid security standard, grid security infrastructure (GSI) uses the SSL
authentication protocol (SAP) to achieve mutual entity authentication between user proxy (UP)
and resource proxy (RP) [2]. Hence, SAP rely on offline certificate-based public key
authentication infrastructure (e.g., X.509), that bring about problems to certificates management
hindering grid scalability, such as poor inter-operability in hierarchical PKIs, certificate
revocation, and poor usability. Therefore, the certificate-free authentication has emerged based on
identity-based cryptography (IBC) using pairings. In IBC, an entity’s public key is directly
derived from its identity information (e.g., name, e-mail address, telephone number, and IP
address). Generally, identity-based authentication overcomes such aforementioned problems with
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its certificate-free feature, however, the private key generator (PKG) used for key distribution has
a key escrow shortcoming. Recently, Wang et. al. [2] present the first grid certificate-less
authentication based on certificate-less public key cryptography (CL-PKC), that is a kind of
cryptography between certificate-based and identity-based PKC. Al-Riyami and Paterson [3]
introduce the CL-PKC to solve the key escrow problem imposed in IBC. CL-PKC not only
preserves all the advantages of IBC, but also avoids the use of certificates. As well, CL-PKC uses
a trusted authority called key generation center (KGC). The later only generates a partial private
key given the users’ identity. The user’s private key is generated by both a partial private key and
a secret value chosen by the user. The user’s public key does not need to be certified, so it is
implicitly certified by the partial private key issued by the KGC.
All the grid authentication mechanisms mentioned above, either have a security issues or are not
efficient to be practical implemented in real environments.
This paper introduces the first pairing-free CL-AKA protocol used in grid computing
environment. We propose a novel secure and efficient pairing-free CL-AKA for grid
authentication (GPC-AKA). Moreover, we provide a security proof for GPC-AKA using an
automated security protocols verification tool.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A literature survey is presented on pairing-free CL-
AKA protocols in Section 2. CL-PKC fundamental concepts are described in Section 3. Section 4
shows the AKA adversary models. Recently pairing-free CL-AKA protocols security analysis are
introduced in Section 5. Our proposed grid pairing-free CL-AKA is presented in Section 6.
Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 7.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The key agreement (KA) is one of the fundamental cryptographic primitives in public key
cryptography. KA allows a shared secret, called a session key intended for cryptographic use, to
be available for two or more parties. For instance, if entity A is assured that no other entity
besides entity B can possibly expose the secret key value, a key agreement protocol is said to
provide implicit key authentication of entity B to A. A key agreement protocol, that provides
mutual implicit key authentication, is called an authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol [4].
There are three types of two-party AKA protocols, considering the message exchange during the
protocol: i) one-round or two pass: both entities require to transmit information to each other, ii)
one-way: only one entity is required to transmit information to the other, and iii) non-interactive:
no information needs to be transmitted between two entities.
For fully secure and efficient grid entities authentication, it is required to build AKA protocol
with high security. However a minimal number of communication passes and low computation
cost. Certificate-less authenticated key agreement (CL-AKA) protocols is based on bilinear
pairings which relative computation cost is approximately twenty times higher than that of a
scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [5]. The pairing is then considered as an expensive
cryptography primitive. Therefore, several CL-AKA protocols, without pairing, have been
proposed to improve efficiency as shown in Table 1.
From the preceding review, we focus on the more recent secure pairing-free CL-AKA protocols.
Although the protocol of Yang et. al. [7] is provably secure, it’s a highly computationally cost as
mentioned later in Section 6.3. The proposed Debiao et. al. [10] and Nashwa et. al. [5] secure
protocols, will be analyzed in Section 5.
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Table 1.  CL-AKA without paring protocols.
Protocol Cryptography
Problem1
Security Model2 Security
Weakness
Geng et. al. [4] GDH Random oracle Type 1 adversary
Hou et. al. [6] GDH mBR Type 1 adversary
Yang et. al. [7] GDH eCK Provably secure
He et. al. [8] GDH mBR Type 1 adversary
He and chen [9] GDH Random oracle Type 1 adversary
Debiao et. al. [10] GDH eCK Provably secure
Nashwa et. al. [5] BDH Swanson Secure
1 Will be discussed in Section 3.3
2 Will be discussed in Section 4
3. PRELIMINARIES OF CL-PKC
This section shows the cryptography notations and fundamentals required to grasp CL-PKC, as
Section 3.1 introduces elliptic curve cryptography. Section 3.2 presents the bilinear pairing
computation process, then Section 3.3 shows the cryptography computational-based problems.
Riyami and Paterson CL-AKA scheme background is reviewed in Section 3.4.
3.1. Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Elliptic curve cryptosystems have the potential to provide relatively small block size, high-
security public key schemes that can be efficiently implemented [11]. Let E/Fp denote an elliptic
curve, E, over a prime finite field Fp, in (1)
y2 = x3 + ax + b, ∀a, b ∈ Fq, (1)
and with the discriminant defined by (2)
∆ = 4a3 + 27b2 ≠ 0 (2)
The points on the curve E/Fp together with an extra point O, called the point at infinity, form a
group G = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Fp, E(x, y) = 0} ∪ {O}. G is a cyclic additive group in the point addition
“+” defined as follows: Let P,Q ∈ G, l be the line containing P and Q (tangent line to E/Fp if P =
Q), and R, the third point of intersection of l with E/Fp. Let l′ be the line connecting R and O.
Then P “+” Q is the point, such that l′ intersects E/Fp at R and O. Scalar multiplication over E/Fp
can be computed as follows: tP = P + P + · · · + P (t times).
3.2. Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 and G2 be additive and multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order q, respectively. Let P
denote a generator in G1. A bilinear pairing is a map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 that satisfies the following
properties [12]:
1. Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab ∀P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zq.
2. Non-degeneracy: P ≠ 0 ⇒ e(P, P) ≠ 1.
3. Computability: e is efficiently computable.
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The above properties also imply ∀P,Q,R ∈ G1: e(P+Q,R) = e(P,R).e(Q,R), e(P,Q+R) =
e(P,Q).e(P,R). Typically, the map e will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an
elliptic curve over a finite field.
3.3. Computational-based Problems
The security of certificate-less cryptography protocols is based on some well-studied problems
that are assumed to be hard to compute efficiently. For appropriately selected parameters, the
following problems are computationally intractable [12]:
1. Computatinal Diffie Hellman (CDH): given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, compute abP ∈ G1.
2. Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH): given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1, decide whether c = ab (mod
q) or not.
3. Gap Diffie Hellman (GDH): given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, and DDH oracle, compute abP.
4. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH): given P, aP, bP, cP ∈ G1, compute e(P, P)abc ∈ G2,
where e a bilinear pairing on (G1,G2).
3.4. Riyami and Paterson CL-AKA Scheme Background
Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] introduce the concept of certificate-less public key cryptography
(CL-PKC). The two-party CL-AKA scheme consists of two phases. First is the setup phase, runs
between KGC and entities. It consists of five probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms:
Setup, SetSecretValue, SetPartialPrivateKey, SetPrivateKey, SetPublicKey. Second is the key
agreement phase. It runs between two entities, by PPT interactive algorithm:
SessionKeyAgreement.
In fact, all the successive CL-AKA protocols that improve the security and efficiency, are based
on Al-Riyami and Paterson protocol.
4. CL-AKA PROTOCOLS ADVERSARY MODELS
This section discuss the most robust adversary models for CL-AKA protocols. Table 2 shows the
general security attributes that apply to key agreement protocols.
There are two types of adversaries, namely, type I adversary (AI ) and type II adversary (AII ) with
different capabilities in CL-PKC. AI does not have access to the KGC master-key, but has the
ability to replace the public key of any entity with a value of its choice (i.e., acts as a dishonest
user). Whereas, AII has an access to the KGC master-key, but cannot replace participants’ public
keys (i.e., acts as a malicious KGC from the beginning of the system setup or an honest-but-
curious KGC, that is malicious after it has generated a master public/secret key pair honestly) [4].
The foremost adversarial model used for AKA protocols security proof is the extended Canetti
and Krawczyk (eCK) model [13]. This model captures unknown key-share (UKS) and Key-
compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, however, it does not capture perfect forward secrecy
(PFS). Swanson [14] propose the first formal security model for the CL-AKA protocol, however,
it is a weak security model as AI is not allowed to replace the public key associated with the
challenge identity. Lippold et. al. [15] transform original eCK model from the traditional PKI-
based setting to the CL-PKC setting. Its strength comes from the ability of an user to use the new
public/private key pair in the rest of the game after the adversary replaces the public key of the
user. Nevertheless, this model is suitable for key agreement protocols based on pairing.
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Table 2. Key agreement protocols security attributes.
Security Attributes
Security Credentials
Compromised Should not be affected
(By Adversary)
Known-key secrecy Other rounds session keys Session key generated
Forward secrecy One or more entities’s long term
private keys
Session keys generated
Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) All entities’s long term private
keys
Session keys generated
KGC forward secrecy KGC’s master key Session keys
generated KGC’s master key
Session keys generated
Key-compromise
impersonation resilience
(KCI)
Entity A’s long term private key Session key with A by
acting as another entity B
Unknown key-share resilience
(UKS)
Entity A should not share a key
with entity C
When in fact A thinks
that it is sharing the key
with entity B
No key control Session key should be
determined jointly by both
entities
None of the entities can
control the key alone to
be the preselected values
Known session-specific
temporary information
security
Randomized input used in a
protocol run
Session keys generated
The aforementioned CL-AKA adversary models are defined via a simulation game between a
challenger C and an adversary AI or AII . The adversary inquires a polynomial number of queries,
such as Create User, Send, Reveal MasterKey, RevealPartialKey, Reveal Secret Value, Reveal
Ephemeral Key, ReplacePublicKey, RevealSessionKey, and Test. At the end of the game, the
adversary AI or AII outputs a bit, b′, as its guess for random coin, b, flipped by C. The Ai’s
advantage of winning the game can be defined as (3),
Adv(Ai) =| Pr(b = b′) − 1/2 |, ∀ i ∈  {I, II} (3)
5. PAIRING-FREE CL-AKA PROTOCOLS SECURITY ANALYSIS
A formal security proof for most CL-AKA protocol haven’t been considered. Some other CL-
AKA protocols are also proposed with heuristic security analysis [9]. In Section 5.1 and Section
5.2, we explore more recent robust pairing-free CL-AKA protocols and address its security
features to improve efficiency and security of pairing-free CL-AKA protocol for grid computing
environment.
5.1. Nashwa et. al. Scheme
Nashwa et. al. [5], introduce a fully secure and efficient CL-AKA without pairing into two
phases, as illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2, respectively.
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Figure 1. Nashwa et. al. [5] key generation setup scheme (Phase 1)
Figure 2. Nashwa et. al. [5] key agreement scheme (Phase 2).
This protocol isn’t pure pairing-free CL-AKA because they move the pairing from entities to
KGC. In the protocol setup phase, shown in Figure 1, there are two pre-computed bilinear
pairings run at the user side to verify the partial private key, DA, computed at KGC. In the key
agreement phase, shown in Figure 2, KGC performs one pairing for each entity to check whether
the entity requested’s public key is valid within the domain or not (i.e., verify that same KGC
master key is used).
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This protocol is non-interactive key agreement protocol (i.e., KGC is involved in key agreement
phase) yielding some drawbacks, such as: i) entities do not authenticate KGC to prevent AII , ii)
the KGC is a single point of failure and vulnerable to DOS attacks or incomplete public key
requests, and iii) the scalability problem rises in a large scale distributed environments, such as
grid computing.
Nashwa et. al. [5] claim that their proposed protocol is fully secure against AI and AII , and
provably secure against Swanson security attributes model. However, we perform a security
analysis in six points as follows:
1. Known-key secrecy: This comes from the fact that, each run of the protocol between two
entities A and B, a random, t, is selected from KGC and no other entities’s ephemeral
values (i.e., t is the only fresh value) involved in session key agreement, so it is
vulnerable to AII .
2. Forward secrecy: Outside adversary has compromised secret value of one entity or more
xID, x′ID can not reveal the current session key K due to the ephemeral random value t,
however, a malicious KGC can determine the previously established session key. So, this
protocol is not secure against AII and does not provide forward secrecy. Moreover, it can
not achieve the perfect forward secrecy.
3. KGC forward secrecy: In this protocol, if the master key, s, of KGC is corrupted, the
security of session keys previously established will not be compromised by any entity due
to the ephemeral random value, t.
4. Key-compromise impersonation: It is possible for adversary, E, to impersonate any
other entities like B to A. E knows SA and get t, A’s public key, so E can compute the
shared secret key. Thus, it is vulnerable to AI (e.g., KCI).
5. Unknown key-share resilience: Entities like A uses QA in computing partial public key
YA for public key authenticity. Only KGC who checks the entities’s public key
authenticities, so this protocol is vulnerable to AI (e.g., public key replacement).
6. No key control: Shared session key should be computed with parameters from all
entities, and no session key control. However the KGC is the only one originate the
random value, t. So, in AII , malicious KGC can predetermine session key K, (e.g., key
escrow).
According to the aforementioned security analysis of Nashwa et. al. protocol [5], it can be shown
that, it is not secure against AI and AII . Therefore, it is inappropriate for grid computing
authentication.
5.2. Debiao et. al. Scheme
Debiao et. al. [10], introduce a provably secure CL-AKA without pairing, as shown in Figure 3
and Figure 4 illustrating the key generation setup, and the key agreement schemes, respectively.
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Figure 3. Debiao et. al. [10] key generation setup scheme (Phase 1).
Figure 4. Debiao et. al. [10] key agreement scheme (Phase 2).
Debiao et. al. protocol [10] is provably secure against eCK adversary model. Moreover, we
perform an analysis in six security attributes as follows:
1. Known-key secrecy: Each session key is unique due to the freshness of A and B
entities’s ephemeral values tA, tB respectively. Thus, compromising a session key will not
affect past or future sessions.
2. Forward secrecy: Even if the long-term private key(s) is compromised, AI does not
reveal previously established session keys without the knowledge of tA, tB, that is exactly
a CDH problem.
3. KGC forward secrecy: In CL-PKC based schemes, if the KGC’s master secret key is
compromised, the previously established session keys will not be exposed.
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4. Key-compromise impersonation: If AI compromise the A entity’s long-term private key,
he would be unable to compute the session key, as xA is unknown.
5. Unknown key-share resilience: Each entity implicit authenticate who it shares the secret
key with, as RA,RB are used for computing the session key.
6. No key control: As most of the existing two-party AKA protocols, the responder entity
gains an unfair advantage over the initiator entity.
We can infer from the above security analysis that Debiao et. al. protocol [10], is secure against AI
and AII. So, it is appropriate for grid computing environment. In the next section, we propose a
novel grid pairing-free CL-AKA protocol to improve the performance of Debiao et. al. protocol
[10], as well as we present a security proof for the proposed protocol.
6. PROPOSED GRID PAIRING-FREE CL-AKA
In Section 6.1, we present the first secure and efficient pairing-free certificate-less two-party
authenticated key agreement protocol for grid computing (GPC-AKA). Furthermore, a security
proof using Scyther tool is provided in Section 6.2. Our proposed scheme is more efficient than
those provable secure schemes as explained in Section 6.3.
6.1. Proposed Protocol (GPC-AKA)
Our proposed secure and efficient GPC-AKA protocol for grid computing has the following
properties: i) pairing-free, less computational cost so to be more efficient. ii) two-party, due to
grid computing environment scalability and dynamic features. iii) one-round, less network
overload so more efficient. iv) the proxies (i.e., UP, RP) can help to meet frequent mutual
authentication requests between users and resources, so support grid single sign on (SSO). v)
unique node’s registered distinguished name (DN) from root to node, to provide cross-trust
domain in which each domain comprises one KGC. Before authentication, trust relationship has
built between KGCs to shared system parameters with each other.
Based on Debiao et. al. protocol we make the following modification to achieve more efficient
and secure protocol used for grid computing environment: i) In phase 1, we use the hashing
functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ × G × G → Z∗q
H2 : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}∗ × G × G × G → Z∗q
ii) In phase 2, We have embedding the entity long term public key PA in key derivation function
H1.
Our proposed Pairing-free certificate-less two party authenticated key agreement for grid (GPC-
AKA) is depicted in Figure 5.
GPC-AKA protocol consistency is proved:
KAB = (tA + DA + xA)(TB + PB + RB + H1(IDB,RB, PB)P0)
= (tA + DA + xA)((tB.P) + (xB.P) + (rB.P) + (QB.sP))
= (tA + DA + xA)(tB + xB + rB + QB.s)P
= (tA + DA + xA)(tB + xB + DB)P = KBA
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Figure 5. Proposed key agreement scheme GPC-AKA (Phase 2).
6.2. Security Proof
We provide a formal security analysis, using automated security protocol verification tool Scyther
version compromise-0.8, on laptop 2 GHz Intel core 2 duo processor, with 6 GB RAM. Scyther
tool present a framework for modeling adversaries in security protocol analysis, ranging from a
Dolev-Yao style adversary to more powerful adversaries, supports notions such as weak perfect
forward secrecy, key compromise impersonation, and adversaries capable of state-reveal queries
[16].
Figure 6 shows the settings of the adversary model used in verifying our proposed GPC-AKA
protocol.
Figure 6. Scyther adversary model used for GPC-AKA verifying.
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We model the GPC-AKA protocol in security protocol description language (SPDL) using
Sycther tool as follows:
/*
* Proposed Pairing-free CL-AKA for Grid (GPC-AKA)
*/
// Hash functions
hashfunction KDF,H;
// Addition, multiplication, simply hashes
hashfunction mult,add;
// The protocol description
protocol GPC-AKA(KGC,UP,RP)
// UP = Initiator, RP = Responder
{
const rA,rB,P;
role KGC // Key Generation Center
{
send_1(KGC,UP,P); // Publish public params
send_2(KGC,RP,P);
}
role UP // User Proxy
{
fresh tA: Nonce; // Ephemeral Secret
var TB: Ticket;
var RB;
recv_1(KGC,UP,P);
send_3(UP,RP,mult(rA,P)); // Send RA
recv_4(RP,UP,RB);
send_5(UP,RP, mult(tA,P)); // Send TA
recv_6(RP,UP,TB);
// Secret Session Key
claim(UP,SKR,KDF(UP,RP,mult(tA,P),TB,mult
(add(tA,sk(UP,KGC),sk(UP)),add(TB,pk(RP),
RB,mult(H(RP,RB,pk(RP))),pk(KGC)))));
}
role RP // Resource Proxy
{
fresh tB: Nonce; // Ephemeral Secret
var TA: Ticket;
var RA;
recv_2(KGC,RP,P);
recv_3(UP,RP,RA);
send_4(RP,UP,mult(rB,P)); // Send RB
recv_5(UP,RP,TA);
send_6(RP,UP,mult(tB,P)); // Send TB
// Secret Session Key
claim(RP,SKR,KDF(UP,RP,TA,mult(tB,P),mult
(add(tB,sk(RP,KGC),sk(RP)),add(TA,pk(UP),
RA,mult(H(UP,RA,pk(UP))),pk(KGC)))));
}
}
Figure 7 shows the proposed GPC-AKA verification using Scyther tool.
International Journal of Security, Privacy and Trust Management ( IJSPTM) Vol 3, No 1, February 2014
34
Figure 7. GPC-AKA scyther security protocol verification.
6.3. Performance Analysis
We compare the efficiency of our protocol GPC-AKA to Geng et. al. [4], Hou et. al. [6], Yang et.
al. [7], He et. al. [8], He and chen [9], Debiao et. al. [10], and Nashwa et. al. [5], in terms of
computational cost and communication overheads as shown in Table 3.
Table 3.  Pairing-free CL-AKA protocols efficiency comparison.
Protocol Computational cost Message exchangeTBP1 Tinv2 Tmul3 Tadd4 Th5
Geng et. al. [4] 7 2 2
Hou et. al. [6] 6 2 2
Yang et. al. [7] 9 2 2
He et. al. [8] 1 5 3 2 2
He and chen [9] 5 4 2 2
Debiao et. al. [10] 5 3 2 2
Nashwa et. al. [5] 1(KGC) 2 1 1+2(KGC)
Proposed GPC-AKA 3 5 2 2
1 Bilinear pairing
2 Multiplicative inverse
3 Elliptic curve point multiplication
4 Elliptic curve point addition
5 Hashing
In this comparison we consider the computations for single entity in key agreement scheme,
excluding the pre-computed ones. It can be shown that, our proposed protocol re- quires less
computation cost, i.e., only 3 multiplication operation, as compared to other protocols that require
7, 6, 9, 5, 5, 5, and 2, operations respectively. As well, it can be noticed that the proposed
protocol keeps the same communication overhead as compared to the others (i.e., only 2 message
exchange). Hence the GPC-AKA protocol is more efficient and appropriate for a practical grid
computing environment.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The certificate-less authenticated key agreement (CL-AKA) approach brought a significant
impacts on grid computing authentication. Whereas CL-AKA implementations rely on bilinear
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pairing which is computationally expensive. Encouragingly, pairing-free CL-AKA can overcame
this performance drawback, particularly in scalable and dynamic grid computing environment. In
this paper, we present a security analysis for the recently secure CL-AKA without pairing,
Nashwa et. al. and Debiao et. al. protocols. Unfortunately, Nashwa et. al. protocol is not secure
against type I and type II adversaries. Based on Debiao et. al. protocol, a novel secure and
efficient pairing-free two-party certificate-less authenticated key agreement protocol for grid
computing (GPC-AKA) is proposed, which improve the performance. Our protocol is provably
secure using a formal security protocol verification Sycther tool. Eventually, the performance
analysis comparison indicates that our proposed protocol GPC-AKA is more efficient than
previous pairing-free CL-AKA protocols.
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